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Introduction 
I n recent years, the Navy and other military services have increasingly evidenced an environmental stewardship ethic in their operations. The impetus for this 
new priority is of both internal and external origin. As microcosms of society, the 
military services are comprised mainly of young Americans for whom 
environmental responsibility is an imbued value. As these individuals have 
assumed leadership positions, the military services have incrementally adopted an 
environmental protection ethic. 
An equal or greater impetus, however, stems from sources external to the 
military services. Domestic law, including that which executes international 
agreements, has substantially increased the environmental protection 
responsibilities of military commanders. While such responsibilities are 
understandably more visible in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 
than in combat, under all circumstances the environmental consequences of 
military operations remain a legal, moral and public relations concern of the 
military commander. 
Today, environmental concerns are a significant factor in the calculus of war 
and MOOTW. The emergence of this new concern has in turn highlighted what 
may be a critical data gap for military commanders and national policy makers: 
from a scientific perspective, the impact of combat and of MOOTW on the marine 
environment is not well understood. Hence, military commanders and national 
policy makers are forced to make decisions based on less than complete 
information. Various approaches can be taken regarding this uncertainty. Some 
might advocate a precautionary approach, refraining from action unless and until 
the probable effects are known and determined to be acceptable. Others might 
strike a different balance, allowing unfettered military operations regardless of 
environmental consequences, perhaps tempered by control only when science can 
demonstrate with certainty unacceptable results. Still others might take a middle 
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course, adopting a broad policy of avoiding widespread, clearly evident 
degradation, based on the limited available scientific information. 
Overlaying this uncertainty is the reality that in order to win during war, 
realistic trai~ing must constantly be conducted during peacetime. For purposes 
of this paper, peacetime training, whether in U.S. or foreign territorial waters or 
on the high seas, is considered a MOOTW. To a large extent, unless specific 
mitigation measures are instituted, the environmental risks and impacts of 
peacetime training are qualitatively much the same as the risks and impacts that 
can be anticipated during war. This begs the question whether different criteria 
should be applied to determine acceptable impacts of military operations on the 
environment during war versus during MOOTW. Perhaps surprisingly, in the 
context of U.S. environmental law, little distinction is made between acceptable 
conduct in war versus MOOTW. 
This paper will focus on the impacts of combat and MOOTW in an attempt to 
resolve three questions. First, what should military commanders and policy makers 
know about the physical environment and the impacts of military operations 
thereon? This paper asserts that, as a minimum, military commanders and policy 
makers must achieve the level of knowledge that is required by legal regimes 
applicable to war and MOOTW. Part I of this paper explores the major knowledge 
requirements imposed on U.S. commanders by domestic law. 
PartII of this paper addresses the question of what do we know aboutthe impacts 
of war and MOOTW on the marine environment. Through a discussion of some 
of the known effects of weaponry, radiation, sound and oil pollution on the marine 
environment, it will be shown that our knowledge in these areas is far from 
complete. 
In its final Part, this paper will suggest an approach for sound policy-making 
in the face of incomplete knowledge regarding the impacts of war and MOOTW 
on the marine environment. 
PART I: WHAT SHOULD BE KNOWN ABOUT THE IMPACTS OF WAR 
AND MOOTW ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT? 
Domestic U.S. law imposes significant knowledge requirements on federal 
agencies, including the military, whose actions may affect the marine 
environment. The discussion below focuses on the three major statutes imposing 
these knowledge requirements. 
National Environmental Policy Act 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandates formal 
documentation and full consideration of the environmental impacts of any 
proposal for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment."l In documenting such impacts, federal agencies must document 
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and consider an extremely broad universe of effects, including those that are direct, 
indirect, cumulative and connected, whether or not such effects are adverse or 
beneficial to the environment.2 Recognizing that in some cases adequate scientific 
information may not be readily available, the regulations further require agencies 
to obtain the necessary information (i.e., do the scientific studies) if the costs 
thereof are not "exorbitant.,,3 If the costs are exorbitant, or if the means to ascertain 
the information are unknown, then the agency must attempt to evaluate such 
impacts based on theoretical approaches or generally accepted scientific research 
methods.4 
The NEPA statute includes no enforcement provisions. Agency compliance 
with NEPA, however, is subject to judicial review throu~h "citizens' suits"-
lawsuits brought by private citizens or groups against federal agencies. 
Accordingly, when preparing environmental documentation, federal agencies 
strive mightily and at great expense to include sufficient scientific information to 
survive judicial review. 
Closely related to NEPA is Executive Order 12114,5 which requires 
environmental impact analysis for certain federal actions significantly affecting 
the environment of the global commons or of foreign nations. Although extremely 
broad in geographic scope, the Order contains numerous exemptions from, and 
qualifications to its requirements, which in effect substantially circumscribe its 
mandate. The Order specifically disavows creation of any right of action, hence 
the threat of potential legal action has not been an inducement for federal agency 
action under the Order. Nevertheless, the Order remains a mandate for collection 
and consideration ofinformation regarding the effects of military activities on the 
marine environment. 
In response to the mandates ofNEPA and Executive Order 12114, the Navy 
and Marine Corps have conducted numerous environmental studies, large and 
small, of the effect of military training operations on the marine environment. The 
costs of these studies may range from the low thousands to several million dollars. 
Endangered Species Act 
u.s. species protection statutes impose very significant scientific knowledge 
requirements on federal entities, including military commanders. The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits federal agencies, including the military, 
from undertaking any action that would jeopardize the continued existence of 
endangered species, or adversely affect their "critical habitat," meaning that 
geographic habitat area necessary for the recovery of the species from endangered 
status. In order to determine the potential impacts of their activities on endangered 
species and critical habitat, federal agencies must conduct biological assessments of 
their activities.6 These assessments generally involve both literature search and 
field study. 
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Biological assessments are then provided to the cognizant wildlife agency, 
which in turn will issue a biological opinion on the probable impacts of the activity 
on endangered species or critical habitat. The biological opinion may indicate that 
the proposed action may have no effect, that it will have no effect provided specified 
mitigation measures are undertaken, or that the action will jeopardize species and 
cannot be mitigated to avoid such impact. A federal action may not proceed in the 
face of a jeopardy opinion, unless relief is granted by the Endangered Species 
Committee, discussed below. 
The ESA's prohibition on "taking" certain species expressly applies to persons 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction "upon the high seas",1 creating a virtually world-wide 
regulatory regime. The statute requires that information developed for 
consultation be the "best scientific and commercial data available."s As mandated 
by the ESA, the Navy has undertaken a number of consultations to ensure that 
operations at sea do not violate statutory requirements. 
Marine Mammal Protection Act 
Like the ESA, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibits the 
"take" of any marine mammal on the high seas. Under the Act, "harassment" of a 
marine mammal is a form of "take." MMP A defines "harassment," in part, as 
" ... any act of pursuit, torment or annoyance which ... has the potential to disturb 
a marine mammal ... in the wild by causing disruption of behavioral patterns, 
including, but not limited to, migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding or 
sheltering.,,9 Given the breadth of this definition, virtually any military action at 
sea, including routine vessel traffic, could result in a "take." In the preamble to a 
draft rule establishing procedures for granting marine mammal harassment 
permits, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) specifically cited 
generation of marine sound as activity that might require a harassment permit. lO 
The draft regulations themselves contemplate ship noise as a potential source of 
harassment.ll The draft regulations require permit applicants to submit scientific 
information such as: the species and numbers of marine mammals likely to be 
found in the vicinity of the activity and, for those likely to be affected, a breakdown 
of such animals by age, sex and reproductive condition; the anticipated impact of 
the activity on the animals and on their food sources and habitat; and a monitoring 
plan to evaluate the actual impact of the activity on marine mammals. l2 NMFS 
must then consider the "best scientific evidence" in determining the probable 
effect of the activity on marine mammals. 13 
Knowledge Requirements in War v. Military Operations Other Than War 
As discussed above, U.S. statutes impose significant requirements regarding 
the collection and consideration of information relative to military operations in 
the marine environment. A related issue is whether this burden is different in 
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combat situations than in other scenarios. Common sense suggests, of course, that 
during war U.S. commanders should not be required to prepare environmental 
impact statements for amphibious assaults, nor obtain a permit for whale 
harassment before conducting an attack on enemy shipping. 
In reality, U.S. laws imposing information collection and consideration 
requirements make litde distinction in environmental requirements between 
peacetime and wartime requirements. NEPA provides no war or national 
emergency exemption. Implementing regulations provide merely that if 
emergency circumstances make it necessary to take action without observance of 
NEPA requirements, the agency should consult the Council on Environmental 
Quality.14 
Neither the Marine Mammal Protection Act nor its implementing regulations 
provide a war or national emergency exemption. The U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that the ESA's prohibition against taking endangered species "reveals a conscious 
decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the 'primary 
missions' offederal agencies.,,15 In recent litigation, the United States Coast Guard 
argued that its mission has priority over endangered species. The U.S. District 
Court judge, in response, threatened an adverse judgment in order to "disabuse 
the Coast Guard of its mistaken understanding of the unequivocal message of the 
ESA.,,16 
In the landmark case of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,17 the Supreme Court 
upheld an injunction against completion and operation of a dam costing more than 
$100 million. Shordy after that case was decided, however, Congress created the 
Endangered Species Committee as a safety valve for relief from the draconian 
effects of the ESA. The Committee, consisting of seven Cabinet-level officials, is 
empowered to exempt a federal action from ESA requirements upon fmding that 
there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the action, and that the benefits 
of the action outweigh the benefits of conserving the species.18 In recognition that 
ESA mandates could adversely impact military operations, the Act provides that 
the Committee must grant an exemption if the Secretary of Defense finds that an 
exemption is necessary in the interests of national defense.19 Under existing law 
and regulation, however, such exemption could be granted only after considerable 
administrative effort, including preparation of a biological assessment and 
consultation with the cognizant wildlife agency. These efforts could take weeks or 
months. Thus, the availability of the exemption for use in defense related 
emergency circumstances, even during war, is not certain. 
In summary, the information collection and consideration requirements of U.S. 
domestic law are substantial. These responsibilities do not disappear, at least for 
purposes of U.S. domestic law, upon the commencement of hostilities. 
92 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
PART II: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE IMPACTS OF 
WAR AND MOOTW ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
Having described some of the requirement for scientific information on this 
subject, this portion of the paper will now discuss the availability of that 
information. 
Certain data regarding anticipated effects of combat on the marine environment 
is available. For example, information is available on the expected lethal blast radii 
of various ordnance, the anticipated persistence in seawater of chemical and 
biological weapon agents, and the impact of petroleum in the ocean 
environment.20 The actual impact of any given military operation on the marine 
environment, of course, would be time and location-specific. Hence, reliance on 
existing scientific data in the making of global policy is problematic. 
Another difficulty encountered relative to scientific data collection in the 
marine environment is the vastness and complexity of the ocean environment 
itself. By way of illustration, below are discussed three case studies in which 
considerable scientific effort has been expended to assess the impacts of three 
different types of potential impacts on the marine environment: radionuclide 
release, oil pollution, and sound propagation. 
Radionuclide Release in the Arctic 
In 1993, the former-Soviet Union released information pertaining to the 
dumping of radioactive waste into the Arctic Seas. A paper known as the Yablokov 
Report or the "White Paper" was published containing data on both source 
locations and the amount and type of solid and liquid waste, high-level waste in 
the form of spent nuclear fuel, unfueled nuclear reactors, and discarded vessels 
containing radioactive waste. 
Subsequently, the U. S. Naval Research Laboratory modeled the dispersion of 
those radioactive contaminants in the Arctic and its marginal seas. Source 
locations and total amounts of disposed radioactive material are based on the 
Yablokov Report. The Navy model investigates only the dispersion of 
contaminants once they have entered the water column. Model coverage extends 
from the pole to approximately 30 degrees North latitude using a grid resolution 
of 0.28 degrees. Several different ten-year model simulations are examined using 
the following source types and locations: 
Low level solid and liquid waste dumped in both the Kara and Barents Seas; 
High level waste, including spent nuclear fuel from reactors dumped along the 
Novaya Zemlya coast in the Kara Sea; and 
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Rivers emptying into the Kara and Barents Seas; and waste dumped from the nuclear 
power plant at Sellafield in the Irish Sea. 
Comparisons of the model's results to recent data indicate that both the river 
and the Sellafield sources can account for a majority of the radioactivity recently 
observed in the Kara Sea. However, when high level radioactive waste is used as 
the source in the model, resulting concentrations of radioactivity are predicted 
approximately an order of magnitude higher than those actually observed. In 
contrast to the predicted impact, these results imply that sources of high level waste 
are not leaking significantly into the water column.21 Were policy development 
based only on the initial effects and the predicted impact, inaccurate limits may 
be established. 
In addition, other sources of radioactive waste from Russia have led to development 
of international policy. In 1993, 237,000 gallons of low-level radioactive waste were 
dumped by Russia into the Sea of} apan. An international meeting of37 countries led 
to a prohibition on the dumping of radioactive waste at sea, with a scientific review 
and reassessment to be performed after 2S years. This prohibition was adopted 
notwithstanding environmental monitoring indicating no observable adverse 
effects as a result of the Russian dumping. 
Gulf War Oil Pollution 
The Gulf War oil pollution episode is an example of how even the best scientific 
methods may not provide accurate predictions of future ecological effects. Studies 
of the Gulf War demonstrate that the effects on the environment were not as severe 
as first anticipated. Numerous studies were also done on the effects of the war from 
both a socio-economic perspective and an ecosystem management perspective, 
taking into account the diverse political regimes in the Gulf that would have to 
cooperate to effectively manage the region as an ecosystem. 
During the Gulf War, a total of 660 million barrels of crude oil were released 
into the atmosphere, onto the desert, and into the water. Of the 660 million, 6 
million to 11 million barrels of crude oil were intentionally released into the 
marine environment by the Iraqi troops, contributing to the world's largest oil 
spill to date.22 The focus of scientific study in the Gulf region has been on the oil 
slick caused by the intentional release, particularly because of the amount of oil 
that impacted the shoreline and the predictions of the long term impacts of a spill 
of such magnitude. . 
Concern for the environment was a part of the wartime operations, with 
mitigation of the slick commencing before fighting ceased. Originally, the slick 
was predicted to behave like the Norwruz spill of 1983 which exhibited massive 
sinking due to strong shamal winds blowing dust onto the oil, causing it to 
flocculate and sink. Since its specific gravity is less than 1.0 (the specific gravity 
of water), oil cannot physically sink unless it is mixed with sediments or particles 
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to make it heavier than water. Fortunately, the Gulf War oil spill did not sink due 
to uncharacteristic wind conditions which transported and contained the 
unrecovered oil against the eastern shorelines of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Also, 
the percentage of floating oil recovered by mechanical means was between 18-37 
percent, greater than what is usually possible with mechanical cleanup 
(approximately 10 percent), thanks to an unprecedented international-scale effort 
in recovery operations. The spilled oil also had a high evaporation rate, estimated 
from 40-50 percent. The remaining amount was stranded on shorelines and in 
intertidal zones. Much of this was left to recover naturally, thus providing an 
opportunity to study the physical processes of weathering and effects of natural 
cleanup.23 
One year after the spill, the Gulf area provided a unique learning opportunity for 
the scientific community as a whole, leading to the largest cooperative scientific 
endeavor in the Gulf region. Known as the "Mt. Mitchell Expedition", a lOO-day 
multi-disciplinary oceanographic research investigation was organized to form a 
comprehensive understanding of the Gulf region and to study the long term effects 
and impacts of the oil spill. The expedition was jointly sponsored by the Regional 
Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), u.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Marine Spill Response Corporation 
(MSRC) with the participation of 140 marine scientists from 15 countries. Lasting 
from 15 January to 13 July 1992, the expedition facilitated much of the data 
collection and synthesis that has been done on the fate and effects of the spill. It 
provided a consolidation point and information management system for 
science-related studies in the Gulf region and has led to a better understanding of 
the effects of the war on the marine environment. The expedition's success was 
measured not only by the wealth of scientific data collected, but also in "the strides 
made in local, regional, and international environmental awareness and political 
cooperation in the Gulf.,,24 
The oil was expected to cause gross contamination to the subtidal biological 
communities of the Gulf. However, the oil did not behave in the hypothesized 
manner. This was largely due to the rapid oil movement and stranding in the 
intertidal zone which kept the oil from sinking, and acclimation of the Gulf marine 
ecosystem to high petroleum impacts. In the Gulf area, microbial populations have 
been regularly exposed to natural seepages of oil that occur in the region. Rapid 
oil degradation and transformation rates exist due to the extreme high 
temperatures in the region. Significant photo-oxidation of polyaromatic 
petroleum compounds also occurs due to the strong solar radiation intensity.25 
Overall, studies confirmed that there was very little "sinking" of the oil as 
originally predicted. Through subtidal sampling conducted during the Mt. 
Mitchell Expedition it was documented that little contamination exists in subtidal 
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areas above background levels, relative to the intertidal areas.26 This leg of the 
expedition showed: 1) no evidence oflarge scale sinking as a result of the spill; 2) 
high levels of contamination in muddy, sheltered basins with low wave energy; 
and 3) oil initially stranded in the intertidal zone did not appear to accumulate in 
the subtidal, near shore regions, as might have been expected. Often it was difficult 
to differentiate whether the source of contamination that was measurable in the 
subtidal regions was from the Gulf War spill (intentional release), oil from sunken 
vessels, or oil residue from previous spills.27 
In reviewing the compilation of data and analyses of scientific studies on the 
effects ofthe Gulf War on the environment, it was found that interpretations of 
the overall "impact" are varied. But taken as a whole, we cannot say definitively 
either way that there was a catastrophic "effect," or any effect at all. The answer 
lies somewhere in between and is dependent upon the particular parameter being 
measured and the assumptions being made. One must be careful in trying to make 
an overarching statement in the extremes, particularly when trying to determine 
the effects of something as complex as the Gulf War. Some of the long term effects 
are not fully known; more time is needed to determine if the Gulf ecosystem will 
recover to its pre-war state. Most experts speculate that it will not return to its 
original state, although complete data on the initial conditions of the Gulf 
ecosystem is also limited. The NOAA chief scientist explained the Gulf situation 
best in stating that "the Gulf (environment) has changed because of the 1991 
conflict; how dramatically it has changed still remains to be seen.,,28 
Sound Propagation in the Marine Environment: The Acoustic 
Thermometry o/Ocean Climate (ATOC) Project 
In many cases, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy are leading 
research to determine the environmental effect of military operations. The 
Congress established the Strategic Environmental Research and Development 
Program (SERDP) on November 5,1990 through Public Law 101-510 to address 
environmental matters of concern to the DOD and Department of Environment 
(DOE). It is conducted as a tri-agencyprogram with participation from the DOD, 
DOE, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The SERDP identifies and 
develops technology to enhance capabilities to meet environmental 
commitments, and fosters the exchange of scientific information and 
technologies among governmental agencies and the private sector. Funding for 
the SERDP has stabilized at about $50M per year for Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996. 
Under the aegis of the SERDP, there are several programs directly addressing 
concerns articulated at this Symposium. Over $50M of SERDP funds are 
encumbered by the Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean Climate (A TO C) project.29 
By sending pulses of underwater sound through the deep ocean basins, scientists 
hope to settle the question of whether the predicted "greenhouse effect" has begun 
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to warm the planet. This experiment exploits the fact that the speed of sound in 
water depends on the water's temperature; the warmer the water, the faster sound 
propagates through it. Any significant change in the speed at which sound 
traverses several thousand miles of seawater would mean a change in the average 
temperature of the water through which the sound passed. By careful 
measurements repeated over a decade or so, it can be demonstrated that seasonal 
and annual trends are dampened and average global and/or basin scale ocean 
temperature changes could be resolved with sufficient accuracy to validate or 
discount greenhouse effect estimates. The generally accepted estimate of 
greenhouse warming at the ocean-atmosphere boundary is 20 millidegrees Celsius 
per year, decreasing exponentially to 5 millidegrees per year at the depth of the 
Deep Sound Channel. The ATOC experiment has the potential to demonstrate 
that a single quantitative global warming signal of 4-5 millidegrees per year at 1 
kilometer ocean depth (average Deep Sound Channel depth) could be confirmed 
at the 95% statistical confidence level in a ten-year observation period.30 
Concurrently, a detailed picture of ocean thermal patterns can be deduced which 
has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of naval systems. 
A strong marine biology program is tightly coupled to the ATOC research 
effort. Although permits from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
were in process, project execution was delayed in 1994 when protests from the 
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council 
forced the NMFS to reconsider and require full Environmental Impact Statements 
(EIS). Opinions regarding the effects of the experiment greatly varied. Hal 
Whitehead, a whale researcher at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, stated that 
"the effects of the sounds on marine mammals could range from deafening, 
through hearing loss, to disturbances in feeding or socializing, to long-term 
psychological effects.,,31 Most scientists are convinced that there is no evidence 
that even extremely loud low-frequency noises emitted by supertanker propellers 
or the underwater blasts from offshore oil explorers and drilling platforms cause 
damage to marine mammals. The animals may be "annoyed" by the sounds, but 
they are certainly not endangered. Further, a report from the Ocean Studies Board 
of the National Academy of Sciences states that although there is an absence of 
hard data, "it appears that low-frequency sound, even at high levels, is barely 
audible to them.,,32 As a calibration point, ATOC proposed transmitting a 260 
watt, 60 to 90 Hertz pulsed signal 2% of the time - 20 minutes on, 4 hours off, every 
fourth day at a depth of 1000 meters. This noise signal is about one-tenth as 
powerful as the sound emitted by a typical supertanker.33 
After nearly two years of discussion, the Marine Mammal Protection Act permit 
for an ATOC source in California was granted in the Spring of 1995. A permit for 
the Hawaii source remains in process. This situation is a typical example of policy 
and regulation that has proceeded without sufficient or reasonable knowledge of 
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actual effects. These regulatory events result in decreased National Security 
capabilities at increasing cost, without significantly improving the basis to 
construct a reasonable and workable policy. 
The previous case studies illustrate the importance of a complete knowledge 
base in forming a complete assessment of the environmental threat of any type of 
marine operation. This knowledge base should consist of known initial 
environmental conditions, short and long term effects, and the actual impacts. 
After evaluating the case studies, an evaluation of the knowledge base concerning 
the environmental threat of military operations can be performed. This knowledge 
base is in fact very thin and, with few exceptions, contains a great deal of 
uncertainty. Thus, it is not surprising that very little capability exists to make 
adequate impact assessments except where there is a similar activity in the civilian 
or commercial sectors. For the most part, military research has focused upon the 
military effectiveness ofweapons systems, rather than on the environmental effects 
thereof. 
PART III: COPING WITH SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY REGARDING 
THE IMPACT OF WAR AND MOOTW ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
As the above discussion indicates, collection and analysis of data regarding the 
impacts of combat on the marine environment is a massive and complex 
undertaking. Even with concerted study efforts over time, it remains difficult to 
predict with a great deal of certainty the long term impacts of combat on the marine 
environment. Because decisions regarding military impacts on the marine 
environment will necessarily be made, by default if not through deliberate process, 
some means of dealing with this scientific uncertainty is required. 
What are the ramifications of this scientific uncertainty on military commanders 
and policy makers? From a domestic law standpoint, the limited knowledge base 
creates a risk of being challenged for noncompliance with domestic requirements, 
with the ever-present possibility of disruptive enforcement action. From an 
international standpoint, the limited knowledge base creates other risks. With the 
benefit of historical hindsight, our activities at sea will be judged in light of actual long 
term impacts, whether adequately anticipated by the scientific community or not. It 
is the unavoidable burden of the policy maker to assume the risk of scientific 
uncertainty when striking the appropriate b~ance between unrestricted military 
operations and environmental protection. 
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